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Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. McCrea, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. 29 (May 12, 2004).1 
 
PROCEDURE – STAY OF LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS –
ARBITRATION 
 
Summary 
  
 Appellants sought a stay of the district proceedings under Nevada Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 8(c), during their appeal of the district court’s denial of appellant’s 
motion to compel arbitration. 
  
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Granted.  The court determined that absent a strong showing of irreparable harm 
or lack of merit, a stay should issue pending the resolution of an appeal from the district 
court’s order refusing to compel arbitration. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Appellant Mikohn Gaming Corporation (Mikohn) hired Respondent McCrea as 
general counsel and secretary in May 1994.  McCrea and Mikohn entered into an 
employment agreement and a separate indemnification agreement.  The employment 
agreement contained a binding arbitration clause for certain issues arising from McCrea’s 
employment.  However, the indemnification contract did not include an arbitration 
clause. 
 After Mikohn brought an action against McCrea for breach of promissory notes in 
district court, McCrea countersued Mikohn based on seven causes of action.2  Mikohn 
filed a motion to either dismiss or compel arbitration of all of McCrea’s claims.  Because 
the district court concluded that five of McCrea’s allegations were based on the 
indemnification agreement, it only granted the motion for two of the claims.   
 As a result, Mikohn appealed and sought a temporary stay in the district court.  
The district court denied the motion to stay.  Thereafter, Mikohn sought a stay from the 
Nevada Supreme Court.  The court granted a temporary stay on October 14, 2003, to 
maintain the status quo while it considered “the interplay of NRAP 8(c)’s stay factors in 
an appeal from an order refusing to compel arbitration.”3 
                                                 
1 By Angela Morrison 
2 The court does not specify either McCrea’s or Mikohn’s claims. 
3 Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. McCrea, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. 29, 3 (May 12, 2004).  Nevada Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 8(c) states: 
Stays in Civil Cases Not Involving Child Custody.  In deciding whether 
to issue a stay or injunction, this court will generally consider the 
following factors: (1) whether the object of the appeal will be defeated 
if the stay or injunction is denied; (2) whether appellant will suffer 
irreparable or serious injury if the stay or injunction is denied; (3) 
whether respondent will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay 
or injunction is granted; and (4) whether appellant is likely to prevail 
on the merits in the appeal. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The court analyzed the issue by looking at whether denial of the stay would:  (1) 
defeat the object of the appeal; (2) result in irreparable harm or serious injury to 
appellant; (3) result in irreparable harm or serious injury to respondent; and (4) whether 
appellant is likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal.4  While acknowledging it has 
not “indicated that any one factor carries more weight than the others,”5 the court stated 
the “first stay factor takes on added significance and generally warrants a stay of trial 
court proceedings pending resolution of the appeal.”6 
 Accordingly, the court began its discussion by defining the object of an appeal 
from an order refusing to compel arbitration.  It concluded “the object of an appeal 
seeking to compel arbitration is to enforce the arbitration agreement and attain the 
bargained-for benefits of arbitration.”7  The court outlined three reasons supporting its 
conclusion: (1) The Uniform Arbitration Act favors arbitration as recognized in the 
Nevada Supreme Court’s prior decisions;8  (2) arbitration is designed to avoid the higher 
monetary and temporal costs of traditional litigation and those benefits would be 
destroyed if a litigant were forced to participate in both “judicial and arbitral forums;”9 
and (3) the Nevada Legislature demonstrated an intent to allow review of a denial of a 
motion to compel arbitration when it provided for interlocutory review of such an order.10 
 The Nevada Supreme Court also analyzed the remaining three factors.  Regarding 
the second and third factors, the court reasoned that, normally, they will not play a 
significant role in a stay decision arising from an appeal of an order denying a motion to 
compel arbitration.  The court ruled that neither party had shown a danger of irreparable 
harm.  Although the court concluded that “a stay is generally warranted,”11 the court left 
open the possibility that a party could defeat a stay by showing that appellate relief is 
unattainable.  In looking at this final factor, the court determined McCrea made no 
showing that the appeal likely would fail on the merits.  Hence, the court granted the stay. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In sum, this opinion reiterates the court’s interest in promoting arbitration.  Given 
the strong presumption in favor of arbitration, a litigant seeking to defeat a stay pending 
the outcome of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration would be prudent to 
argue the merits of the pending appeal.  The result of this decision may be increased 
litigation because parties involved in an appeal from an order refusing to compel 
arbitration will litigate the merits of the appeal twice.   
                                                                                                                                                 
NEV. R. APP. P. 8(c) (2004). 
4 Mikohn, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. at 4-5 (citing NEV. R. APP. P. 8(c)). 
5 Id.  
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 6. 
8 Id. (quoting Phillips v. Parker, 106 Nev. 415, 417, 794 P.2d 716, 718 (1990)). 
9 Mikohn, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. at 5 (citing Bradford-Scott Data v. Physician Computer Network, 128 F.3d 
504, 506 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
10 Id. (citing NEV. REV. STAT. 38.205(1)(a)  (repealed 2001)). 
11 Id. at 7. 
 
